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People demonstrate an impressive ability to self-deceive, distorting misbehavior to reflect
positively on themselves—for example, by cheating on a test and believing that their
inflated performance reflects their true ability. But what happens to self-deception when
self-deceivers must face reality, such as when taking another test on which they cannot
cheat? We find that self-deception diminishes over time only when self-deceivers are
repeatedly confronted with evidence of their true ability (Study 1); this learning, however,
fails to make them less susceptible to future self-deception (Study 2).
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Introduction
Imagine a stock trader who has access to insider information on particular firms, and as a result of
using this information earns exceptionally high returns. If he then judges his stock trading ability by
this performance, he may deceive himself into expecting high returns when he invests in other firms
as well—discounting his cheating as the cause of his performance in favor of a self-deceptive view
that the performance was due to his ability. Imagine that in his subsequent trades, he is lacking any
insider information; over time, as a result, his future portfolio performance will give him unbiased
evidence of his true ability. Will the trader eventually readjust his self-deceptive beliefs, and come to
a more realistic understanding of his true ability?
We study both the decay and subsequent revival of self-deception in situations in which cheaters
who have believed their superior performance was due to exceptional ability are then confronted
with evidence of their true ability. How many doses of reality does it take before the truth sinks in
and is accepted? After realizing the force and pitfalls of self-deception, are individuals less likely to
engage in self deception in the future?
Motivated Views of the Self
People tend to see themselves through rose-tinted glasses. Decades of research document the
tendency to self-enhance (Greenwald, 1980; Sedikides and Strube, 1997), with most people inflating
their standing on positive attributes ranging from intelligence to ability to morality (Alicke, 1985;
Taylor and Brown, 1988). Much of the empirical work on biased self-evaluations has explored the
motivation for overestimating our own abilities or viewing ourselves as better than we truly are (e.g.,
Burson et al., 2006). This motivation is so strong that most people ignore or rationalize negative
information about themselves to maintain a positive self-image (Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987;
Kunda, 1990; Chance and Norton, 2010). They use motivated reasoning to interpret ambiguous
information in ways that confirm their—generally positive—beliefs and attitudes about themselves
(e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Swann et al., 1992). Moreover, people display
impressive creativity in justifying questionable behavior and decisions (e.g., Norton et al., 2004; Gino
and Ariely, 2012).
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Self-deception
Although honesty is central to the self-concept (Blasi, 1984;
Aquino and Reed, 2002), people routinely attempt to deceive
others: in one diary study, participants reported lying once or
twice a day (DePaulo et al., 1996).While some of these are “white”
lies to protect others’ feelings, many are self-serving. Rather than
lying to maximize their economic utility, however, people often
use a “fudge factor” that gives them some moral wiggle room—to
lie or cheat just a little (Mazar et al., 2008). Farrington and Kidd
(1977) show that people are more likely to dishonestly accept a
smaller amount of money, and Goldstone and Chin (1993) show
that people rarely fail to report making copies, but rather often
underreport the number of photocopies they had made—even
when they were not monitored.
Deceiving others has the potential benefit of getting ahead,
even just to save a few pennies. But why would humans deceive
themselves? Evolutionary psychologists have posited that self-
deception evolved to assist in other-deception—the surest way to
deceive others and not display signs of lying is to deceive oneself
(e.g., Trivers, 2000). Most relevant to the present research, self-
deception can allow people to hold preferred beliefs, regardless
of the truth. Whereas motivated reasoning describes the general
process ofmaintaining preferred beliefs, self-deception is a special
case. “Stock examples of self-deception, both in popular thought
and in the literature, feature people who falsely believe—in the
face of strong evidence to the contrary—that their spouses are not
having affairs, or that their children are not using illicit drugs, or
that they themselves are not seriously ill” (Mele, 2001, p. 9). We
follow Mele in defining self-deception as a positive belief about
the self that persists in spite of disconfirming evidence.
Such beliefs can be maintained by attending to desirable
evidence and avoiding conflicting undesirable evidence whenever
possible. Greenwald (1997) compares knowledge avoidance
to junk mail processing: if knowledge can be identified as
unwelcome, a person may discard it before examining it
thoroughly to learn precisely what it is. Self-deception is thus
possible when ambiguity or vagueness leaves room for error or
distortion (Gur and Sackeim, 1979; Baumeister, 1993; Mijovic-
Prelec and Prelec, 2010; Sloman et al., 2010).
Chance et al. (2011) provided a new paradigm for
demonstrating self-deception: participants who had an
opportunity to cheat on a test by being given access to an
answer key—and who therefore performed well—systematically
overestimated their performance on future tests. Faced with the
choice between attributing their performance to the presence of
the answers or their own ability, people chose to self-deceive,
convincing themselves that their performance was due not
to the answers but to themselves. Importantly, Chance et al.
(2011) incentivized participants for accurate predictions in
one experiment. Whereas monetary incentives have eliminated
face-saving lies in other studies (e.g., Dana et al., 2006),
participants in the Chance et al. (2011) study who were paid
for both performance and accuracy overpredicted their scores
even when those overpredictions were costly—suggesting that
overpredictions were self-deceptive rather than simply a no-
consequence decision that allowed them to maintain consistency.
As further evidence that the paradigm captures self-deception,
overpredictions in the Chance et al. (2011) paradigm were
correlated with trait self-deception, as measured by a scale of
self-deceptive denial (Paulhus, 1998).
The Present Research
Previous experiments have examined self-deception as
a momentary phenomenon. Life, however, offers many
opportunities to act, to gather information, and to update
beliefs—or not. In this work, we allow participants to cheat on
an ability-based task to reap greater financial reward. We suggest
that, rather than interpreting their behavior as a negative signal
about themselves (“I’m a cheater”), self-deceivers use the positive
outcome of cheating to bolster positive beliefs about themselves
(“I’m a high achiever”). We add to the previous research on self-
deception by using a modified version of the paradigm developed
by Chance et al. (2011) to study whether and how quickly self-
deception decays when individuals are confronted with repeated
evidence of their actual ability. Building on the previous work,
we also test how people’s chronic tendencies to lie to themselves,
and to others, relates to the pattern of overpredictions over time.
Study 1 observes the decay of self-deception when an initial act of
self-deception (inflating one’s sense of one’s abilities on the basis
of a high score achieved by cheating) is followed by two rounds
of unbiased feedback (scores on subsequent tests without an
opportunity to cheat). Study 2 explores whether a second cheating
opportunity can counteract the debiasing effect of feedback
on actual abilities and reinstate self-deception. Together, these
studies map the slow decay and quick revival of self-deception.
Study 1: The Decay of Self-deception
Study 1 examines the extent to which self-deception persists
despite repeated evidence against a desired self-view. Participants
completed a battery of four tests of general knowledge, predicting
their score before the last three. Some participants—those in the
answers condition—had access to an answer key for Test 1, and
we expected them to use it to cheat (evidenced by outperforming
a control group without answers). We also expected their high
scores to trigger self-deception, leading them to overpredict their
scores on subsequent tests for which they did not have answer
keys. Performance on these subsequent tests offered repeated
evidence of participants’ true ability. We assessed the extent to
which the inflated predictions of participants given the answers
on Test 1 would be tempered by their later experience taking tests
without the answers, hypothesizing that their predictions would
eventually but not immediately converge with their true ability.
Previous research has shown self-deception in this paradigm
tracked with participants’ chronic inclination to self-deceive
(Chance et al., 2011), and we expected that the decay of self-
deception here would be related to chronic self-deception as well.
We hypothesized that for participants in the answers condition,
self-deception would be greater and persist longer for those
who were dispositionally high in self-deception. Furthermore,
using an other-deception related scale in combination with
the self-deception scale allowed us to test whether prediction
gaps were indeed correlated with self-deception and not with
lying.
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Since the design of these self-deception studies makes
cheating ambiguous—intentionally so, to make self-deception
possible—we conducted a pilot study to test whether using the
answer key did indeed constitute cheating. According to Jones
(1991) definition of unethical behavior, community members,
rather than researchers or participants given the opportunity to
cheat, are the appropriate judges of which behaviors constitute
cheating. Sixty-five participants from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk read a description of our experimental research paradigm,
including the instructions to participants, learned the results,
and were asked to write four words describing the test takers.
In their open-ended responses, “cheating” was the second most
common open-ended response (15 people), after “dishonest” (22
people); 86% used the words “cheating,” “dishonest,” “unethical,”
or synonyms of these words. Participants also rated the extent
to which they considered this behavior to constitute cheating,
on a 10-point scale (1: definitely not cheating to 10: definitely
cheating). The mean response was 6.98 (SD= 2.86), with a modal
response of “10.” Another group of 64 participants read about
participants in the control condition, and indicated on the same
scale whether that group was cheating; the mean response was
2.50 (SD = 2.63); the modal response was “1” (definitely not
cheating). These results suggest that people judge the behavior of
study participants in the answers condition who achieve higher
scores to be unethical, such that “cheating” is an appropriate
descriptor of their behavior. Cheaters do not need to perceive
themselves as cheaters—indeed, they may be self-deceived.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy-one student and community member participants (33
male, Mage = 23.9, SD = 3.54) from the paid subject pool of
a large, northeastern university were paid $20 to complete this
experiment as the first of a series of unrelated studies during a
1-h group lab session. Participants also had the opportunity to
earn performance-based bonus pay. Sample size was determined
by laboratory capacity, and privacy dividers separated participants
from one another.
Design and Procedure
Each participant was assigned to either the control or the answer
condition. Both groups completed a series of four tests of general
knowledge trivia, such as “What is the only mammal that truly
flies?” (Moore and Healy, 2008), configured into four 10-question
tests. Participants learned at the beginning of the study that in
all four tests, they would earn a $0.25 bonus for each correct
answer. This incentive encourages cheating, which is required for
self-deception in this paradigm, although a monetary incentive is
not always necessary for prompting cheating and self-deception
(Chance et al., 2011).
For Test 1, participants in the answers condition had the
answers to all ten questions printed in an answer key at the
bottom of the page. Their instructions read, “It’s okay to check
your answers as you go, but please do your own work.” These
instructions were intentionally ambiguous—they did not prohibit
looking at the answers, but they did imply that using the answer
key to choose answers would be wrong. The control group
completed the same test questions but without the answer key
or instructions. All participants were given 3 min to complete
Test 1. After handing their completed Test 1 to an experimenter,
they were given a score sheet with an answer key, on which
they recorded from memory which questions they had answered
correctly. This procedure prevented participants in the control
group from using the answer key to change their answers. It
did not prevent either group from inflating their reported score,
therefore we recorded the actual score as well. After completing
and turning in the score sheet, participants in both conditions had
seen the answers for Test 1 and knew their Test 1 scores.
When participants received Test 2, they were asked to look
it over before writing down their predicted score. The preview
ensured that those in the answers group could confirm that the
test would not include an answer key. It also reduced the implicit
admission of guilt thatmight be associated with predicting a lower
score on the second test than the first (“If I say I will do worse, the
researchers will know I cheated”), by giving participants a valid
excuse (“I just don’t happen to know these particular answers”).
Thus, this design provided a strong test of our prediction that
participants who had cheated on the first test would deceive
themselves into predicting an unrealistically high score on the
second.
After predicting their score, participants spent 3 min
completing Test 2, then repeated the process three more times:
scoring Test 2 on a separate answer sheet; looking over Test 3 and
making a prediction; scoring Test 3 on a separate answer sheet;
looking over Test 4 and making a prediction; and scoring Test 4
on a separate answer sheet. Note that for all participants, Tests 2,
3, and 4 did not include answers at the bottom; and participants
had only one sheet in front of them (either a test/prediction sheet
or an answer key/score sheet) at all times.
When participants had finished the testing procedure, they
moved on to other unrelated studies which also included
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus,
1998). We used the self-deceptive enhancement and the
impression management components of the BIDR, to distinguish
dispositional self-deception from dispositional lying. At the end
of the study session, participants received their bonus payment.
Because participants were not deceived (by the experimenters),
the university Human Subjects Committee approving the
experiment determined that debrief was not required.
Results and Discussion
Cheating
We predicted participants in the answers condition would inflate
their performance on the first test by looking at the answers.
Indeed, they reported scoring higher than the control group,
t(69) = 6.62, p < 0.001, d = 1.58 (Table 1). Our subsequent
analyses reflect reported scores, since self-deception relies on
beliefs; however, using actual scores here or in any of the
subsequent analyses did not affect the direction or significance of
the results.
On the test in which cheating was possible, the average score
was 7.89 out of 10, indicating either a mixture of cheaters and
non-cheaters, many people cheating just a little, or both. Whereas
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TABLE 1 | Study 1 scores and predictions.
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Answers Prediction 6.28 5.72 5.53
Score 7.89* 4.94 5.06 5.11
Control Prediction 5.46 5.06 5.03
Score 4.51 5 4.77 4.86
*Answer key available, cheating possible.
no participants in the control condition reported perfect scores (a
“10”) on Test 1, 44% of participants in the answers condition did.
However, even excluding perfect scores, Test 1 scores were higher
in the answers than the control condition (6.20 vs. 4.51). This
suggests many people cheating just a little, consistent with Mazar
et al. (2008) theory of self-concept maintenance, which posits
that people avoid negative self-signals by cheating only within an
acceptable range.
Behavioral Self-deception
We expected that if participants in the answers condition were
self-deceived, their predictions for subsequent tests would be
higher than their actual scores; we expected this gap to be highest
on Test 2—immediately after participants had cheated to achieve
a high score on Test 1—and to decline over time. We did not
expect participants in the control condition—who were not given
the opportunity to cheat—to show a gap between their predictions
and actual performance on Tests 2 through 4.
A paired t-test confirmed that Test 2 predictions exceeded Test
2 scores for participants in the answers condition, t(35) = 3.67,
p = 0.001, d = 0.73 (Table 1) reflecting self-deception: despite
having had the chance to examine the questions on Test 2 and
confirm no answers were included, participants in the answers
group expected to performbetter than they did. Their surprisingly
low scores on Test 2 did not eliminate their self-deception: their
predictions for Test 3 were also significantly higher than their
Test 3 scores, t(35) = 2.52, p = 0.02, d = 0.35 (Table 1). Only
after scoring below their expectations on both Tests 2 and 3 did
self-deception decay completely: predictions for Test 4 were not
significantly higher than actual scores, t(35) = 1.13, p = 0.27,
d = 0.20 (Table 1).
By contrast, predictions did not differ significantly from scores
for participants in the control group for any of the three tests: Test
2 [t(34) = 1.36, p = 0.18], Test 3 [t(34) = 0.95, p = 0.35], Test
4 [t(34) = 0.67, p = 0.51] (Table 1). The lack of overprediction
in the control group also indicates the inflated predictions of
participants in the answers condition are not related to mere
overconfidence: overconfidence would suggest people might
generally inflate their predictions (Moore and Healy, 2008), but
this pattern was not observed.
Dispositional Self-deception
We also explored whether the general tendency to self-deceive
would relate to the decay in the observed prediction-performance
gaps. Self-Deceptive Enhancement was indeed correlated with
overpredictions on the second test (r = 0.40, p = 0.02) in the
answers condition, but not the control condition (p = 0.79).
FIGURE 1 | Overpredictions on Tests 2-4 by high and low
self-deceivers in Study 1.
A median split on Self-Deceptive Enhancement revealed that
high self-enhancers were driving the self-deceptive predictions
observed in the answers group, and that their bias was strong
even in predictions for Test 3. High self-deceivers significantly
overpredicted their scores on Test 2 [6.58 vs. 4.84, t(18) = 3.07,
p = 0.007, d = 0.93] as well as Test 3 [5.95 vs. 4.95, t(18) = 2.73,
p= 0.01, d= 0.57], but eventually even this group tempered their
expectations to conform to reality, more accurately predicting
their scores on Test 4 [5.74 vs. 5.11, t(18) = 1.23, p = 0.24].
Low self-deceivers in the answers group, on the other hand, did
not show significant differences between any of their predictions
and subsequent scores (all p’s > 0.10). This pattern of results
is shown in Figure 1. As expected, Impression Management
showed no significant relationship to overpredictions in either
the answers or the control group (all p’s > 0.10), suggesting that
the overpredicting observed here does not derive merely from
a strategy to impress others such as the experimenters. For the
answers group, we also compared Self-Deceptive Enhancement
of those reporting perfect scores (likely cheaters) to those
scoring lower; although the sample size was small and the
observed difference not significant, those reporting perfect
scores showed directionally higher Self-Deceptive Enhancement
[7.19 vs. 6.20, t(34) = 0.64, p = 0.52]. Note that the self-
deception observed here is not complete: participants in the
answers condition do predict lower scores on Test 2 than
they received on Test 1. These results suggest that rather than
witnessing complete self-deception, we observe a self-deceptive
miscalibration that then diminishes even more in the face of
feedback.
These results demonstrate that self-deceivers come to
terms with reality only when faced with repeated exposure
to counterevidence against their preferred beliefs—for these
participants, scoring lower on multiple tests they could not cheat
on—and do so eventually rather than immediately. This pattern
is most striking for those with a dispositional tendency toward
self-enhancement.
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Study 2: The Revival of Self-deception
Study 1 showed that when a single episode of cheating results
in superior performance, it can lead to self-deception, but
that repeated corrective feedback diminishes self-deception over
time. However, in addition to providing evidence of a person’s
true abilities, life also offers repeated temptations to engage
in questionable behavior, and thus repeated opportunities to
self-deceive. Could later opportunities to cheat reinstate self-
deception, overwhelming the educational effect of corrective
feedback?
In Study 2, after some participants had cheated on Test 1
and had then taken Test 2 without an answer key and received
legitimate feedback, we gave them a second chance to cheat by
providing them with answers for Test 3. We predicted that those
with the answer key for Test 3 would cheat again, and that their
inflated scores would revive self-deception, evidenced by inflated
predictions of their scores on Test 4.
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred forty-eight student and community member
participants (68 male, Mage = 23.0, SD = 2.10) from the paid
subject pool of a large, northeastern university were paid $20 to
complete this experiment as the first of a series of unrelated studies
during a 1-h lab session. Participants also had the opportunity to
earn performance-based bonus pay. Sample size was determined
by laboratory capacity, and privacy dividers separated participants
from one another.
Design and Procedure
The design, procedure, and incentives in Study 2 were similar to
those in Study 1. Briefly, participants took four tests and earned
$0.25 for every correct answer. After each test was completed and
scored, and after they had seen the answers, they looked over the
next test, predicted their score, and completed the test. The only
difference between Study 2 and Study 1 was that participants in
the answers condition had an answer key at the bottom of Test 3
as well as Test 1.
Results and Discussion
Cheating
We predicted that participants in the answers condition would
cheat when they had the opportunity, reporting higher scores than
the control group. This was true in both cases in which they had
the answer key, Test 1 [t(146)= 8.07, p< 0.001, d= 1.33] and Test
3 [t(146)= 8.79, p < 0.001, d = 1.46] (Table 2).
TABLE 2 | Study 2 scores and predictions.
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Answers Prediction 6.06 6.95 5.75
Score 7.65* 5.55 7.46* 5.28
Control Prediction 4.97 4.51 4.79
Score 5.03 5.34 4.68 4.88
*Answer key available, cheating possible.
Self-deception
We also predicted, as in Study 1, that participants who had the
opportunity to cheat on Test 1 would self-deceive: we expected
their Test 2 predictions to be higher than their actual scores.
A paired t-test confirmed that Test 2 predictions were indeed
higher than Test 2 scores for participants in the answers condition
[t(79) = 2.69, p < 0.01, d = 0.24] but not for those in the
control condition, who predicted marginally lower scores than
they achieved [t(67)= 1.87, p= 0.07] (Table 2).
Whenparticipants in the answers condition predicted their Test
3 scores, they did so with the knowledge of the answer key at
the bottom of that test. We had no specific hypothesis regarding
these predictions because we were interested in determining how
cheating on Test 3 might influence their predictions for Test 4. We
found Test 3 predictions for those in the answer key group were
lower than the scores [t(79) = 2.59; p = 0.01, d = 0.23], whereas
predictions for those in the control condition did not differ from
the scores [t(67) = 0.91; p = 0.37] (Table 2).
Our key hypothesis in this study was that participants in the
answers condition would reengage in self-deception after the
second opportunity to cheat, and would predict unrealistically
high scores on Test 4. As expected, they did so [F(79) = 6.73,
p = 0.01, d = 0.23], whereas those in the control group did
not predict unrealistically high scores [F(67) = 0.12, p = 0.73]
(Table 2). A second opportunity to cheat appears to have
reinstated self-deception, overcoming any learning from the
unbiased feedback on Test 2.
General Discussion
One might expect people who cheat on tests—or insider
traders—to feel worse about their abilities as a result of their
questionable behavior. After all, if they had been more talented,
they would have had no reason to cheat. However, when self-
deception is possible, ethics can fade (Tenbrunsel and Messick,
2004). People tend to focus on the positive outcome of their
cheating and neglect the unsavory process that led to it.
Although the construct of self-deception has a long history
in psychology, the nature of the process by which self-deception
takes place is still subject to debate (Audi, 1997; Mele, 2010;
Bandura, 2011; McKay et al., 2011; von Hippel and Trivers,
2011). In these two studies, we showed that though self-deception
does occur rapidly, there is some decay over time, suggesting
that self-deception may provide temporary boosts to the self-
concept but that these boosts may be relatively short-lived given
corrective feedback from the environment (Study 1). Additionally,
Study 2 demonstrates that sensitivity to feedback depends on
the extent to which it enables self-deception; feedback bolstering
motivated beliefs in superior abilities seems to be given more
weight than feedback about actual abilities. As a result, it appears
as though people are vulnerable to serial self-deception, awaiting
opportunities to inflate their self-views and only grudgingly
adjusting them downward. Study 1 demonstrates that inflated
predictions of subsequent performance in the answers group
correlate with general self-deceptive enhancement, and have
suggested that these results suggest that participants engage in
self-deceptivemiscalibration. Future researchmight disambiguate
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total self-deception from general miscalibration by comparing
predictions of own scores to predictions of others’ scores, allowing
an assessment of whether people demonstrate self-deceptive
miscalibration only when they are the focal actor, or whether even
observing others induces miscalibration.
In our studies, we explored self-deception using a specific
set of tasks similar to test situations in which students might
have the opportunity to cheat. Although our focus was the
impact of self-deception on people’s beliefs about their future
performance, self-deception in similar contexts might also affect
subsequent behavior. It could, for example, lead students to spend
less time preparing for future tests, thus reducing their learning
as well as hampering their future performance. It might also
increase the likelihood of cheating again, by allowing people to
feel good about themselves and their abilities when they cheat
(and then self-deceive). Future research is needed to examine
these negative behavioral consequences of self-deception, not
only in the context of academic cheating but also in the
many situations in which people inflate their performance by
cheating and then deceive themselves about why they did so
well.
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